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Case Summaries Hon. Seamus P. McCaffery

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Superior Court, Western District

Case Summaries

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: Appellant sought review of the trial court's order changing the children's placement goal from reunification to adoption. The Court addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the placement goal change, despite Appellant's progress in her permanency plan. Finding substantial evidentiary support, the trial court's decision was affirmed because it properly focused on advancing the children's best interests, not the parents. Next, Appellant claimed that Children and Youth Services (CYS) failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parents and children. Since the evidence within the record supports the trial court's order, the Appellant's contention was dismissed as meritless. Appellant challenged the propriety of ending visitation with her children, reasoning that the placement goal changes were unjustified so discontinuing visitations must also be unjustified.

Court's Decision: This Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing placement goals for the two children from reunification to adoption. Affirmed. The court rejected the Appellant's claim that CYS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify based on evidence in the actual record in contrast to Appellant's claim without any factual or legal support.

Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

Freed v. Geisinger Medical Center, 910 A.2d 68 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: Appellant, a parapalegic patient, appealed the entry of nonsuit granting in favor of Appellees, GMC and HealthSouth, in a medical malpractice action for failure to meet the medical standard of care. During the jury trial, the court excluded Appellant's expert witnesses and granted Appellee's motion for entry of compulsory nonsuit for failure to establish a prima facie negligence case. Appellant sought review of the trial court's evidentiary rulings precluding expert witness testimony to establish causation for the prima facie case.

Decision of Court: The Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding a nurse, who was competent to provide expert testimony about medical causation between the standard of care and Appellant's pressure wounds. Thus, the trial court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for trial. However, the trial court's rulings relative to other expert witnesses were affirmed for failure to present testimony about causation.

Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

Simmons v. Cobb, 906 A.2d 582 (Pa.Super. 2006)
Issue: The action arose when a motorist filed suit against the driver for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Appellant, motorist. Appealed the judgment entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas following the denial of his post-trial motions. The trial court ruled that Appellant could not present evidence about social security disability beneffits, due to the “collateral source rule.” Appellant raised three issue on appeal relating to whether lower trial court improperly denied his pretrial request to introduce evidence that he was receiving social security benefits; including (1) whether the trial court err as a matter of law in barring the introduction of testimony concerning [Appellant's] favorable Social Security Disability determination during examination of the parties' vocational experts; (2) whether the trial court abuse its discretion in barring the introduction of testimony concerning [Appellant's] favorable Social Security Disability determination during examination of the parties' vocational expert; and (3) whether any error committed by the trial court was prejudicial.

Decision of Court: The Court found that the collateral source rule was not applicable so as to preclude motorist from introducing evidence that he was receiving social security disability (SSD) benefits. It held that a new trial was unwarranted, since any reliance on the SSD information was not harmful or prejudicial. Affirmed.
Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

McGuire Performance Solutions, Inc. v. Massengill, 904 A.2d 971 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: Appellant, Massengill, appealed from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in favor of Appellee, McGuire Performance Solutions, Inc., and against Appellant, in the amount of $125,000. Specifically, Appellant asks the Court to determine whether (1) McGuire lacked the authority or standing to institute the present action; (2) the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by permitting McGuire to amend its complaint to conform to the evidence.

Decision of Court: The Court held that the trial court’s judgment was proper on all counts and thus, affirmed.
Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

Urmann v. Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: Arising from severe injuries sustained in an automobile accident while within the scope of his employment, Appellant, as the worker’s compensation carrier for the Company, began payment of workers’ compensation wage loss and medical benefits to Mr. Urmann. The Urmans filed a third-party tortfeasor action against Appelles claiming their negligence contributed to the Urmann’s injuries, including personal injuries in the accident and the wife’s loss of consortium claims. Appellees’ and the Urmann’s mediation before the Allegheny Court of Cmmon Pleas resulted in a settlement of $300,000 for all claims, $50,000 for physical and mental injuries, and $250,000 for Mrs. Urmann for her loss of consortium. While the Urmanns petitioned the trial court to approve the settlement terms, Appellant opposed its approval because of the 80% apportionment of recovery to Mrs. Urmann for loss of consortium rather than the total settlement amount. Since during the course of evidentiary hearings testimony was proferred that Mr. Urmann suffered injuries that resulted in a condition similar to an Alzheimer’s patient, the President Judge approved the apportionment of damages contrary to Appellant’s allegations as the loss was extreme. Appellant challenged the order on five counts, specifically asserting that (1) Appellees failed to meet the burden of persuasion for reasonable apportionment of a civil action; (2) the apportionment was improperly based upon Appellees’ unsupported declaration of the value of the spousal claim; (3) the ruling was erroneous as a matter of law relative to the declared value of the spousal claim was not subject to the same compromise as the claim; (4) the approval of Appellees’ apportionment violated public policy considerations by creating a potential for abusive civil settlements; and (5) the approval of Appellees’ unilateral apportionment was contrary to the insurer’s subrogation right.

Decision of Court: The Court rejected Appellees’ five allegations and held that the trial court acted properly in approving the settlement agreement. Thus, the trial court’s order was affirmed.

Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

Thomas Jefferson University v. Wapner, 903 A.2d 565 (Pa.Super. 2006)
Issue: Instituting an action for claims of breach of duty of loyalty, breach of contract, tortious interference with existing and prospective contracts, misappropriation of trade secrets, and civil conspiracy, Jefferson filed suit against Drs. Wapner and Levine, both of whom had left Jefferson's employ and had begun working at a competitor hospital. In its complaints, Jefferson Drs. Wapner and Levine filed counterclaims against Jefferson, asserting violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 P.S. § § 260.1-260.12 (“WPCL”), as well as breach of contract and tortious interference claims. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered judgment on a jury verdict for physicians, and medical practice appealed. On appeal, Jefferson raised five issues on appeal, including (1)whether the trial court erred by denying Jefferson [JNOV] against [Drs. Wapner and Levine] on the breach of duty of loyalty claims because, at trial, it was conclusively established that Drs. Levine and Wapner breached their duties of loyalty, such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in Jefferson's favor; (2) whether Jefferson preserved its right to seek [JNOV] against [Drs. Wapner and Levine] on the breach of duty of loyalty claims when Jefferson requested that the trial court give a binding instruction on its breach of duty of loyalty claims, which request the trial court denied; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying Jefferson [JNOV] on Dr. Wapner's claim that Jefferson did not have a good faith assertion of a right of setoff under Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 P.S. [§ ] 260.1 et seq. (the “WPCL”) as to Dr. Wapner's wages; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying Jefferson a new trial based on the trial court's erroneous instruction allocating to Jefferson the burden of proving that it had a good faith assertion of a right of setoff as to Dr. Wapner's WPCL claims; and (5) whether the trial court erred by denying Jefferson's post-trial motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Decision of Court: The Court found that the trial court correctly identified the evidence important to the jury's determination. The Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the verdict did not shock the conscience and thus, concluded that the court made no error in refusing to grant a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. Therefore, it found that Jefferson was not entitled to appellate relief and the trial court's refusal to grant JNOV on Jefferson's duty of loyalty claim was proper, as was its refusal to grant JNOV on Dr. Wapner's counterclaim under the WPCL. Further, the Court found that the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding good faith under the WPCL was correct and its decision to deny Jefferson a new trial based on the weight of the evidence shall not be disturbed. Thus, it affirmed the judgment.

Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: Father appealed from the trial court order terminating his parental rights by alleging that court order barred him from seeing the. The Department of Children & Youth Services filed cross-appeals challenging the denial of termination of Mother’s parental rights. Parties appealed following the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas, Chester County, Orphans' Court Division, which terminated father's parental rights but denied petition to terminate mother's parental rights. Father’s sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or commited an abuse of discretion by involuntarily terminating [Father's] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. Section[s] 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8).
Decision of Court: Upon review, the Court affirmed the order terminating Father's parental rights, but vacated the order regarding Mother's parental rights and remand for proceedings to address the needs and welfare of the children. The Court found that Mother’s conduct met statutory grounds for termination, but insufficient evidence was offered about the children’s needs, especially whether termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve their best interests. The Court held (1) there was no error because sufficient evidence supported the termination of father's parental rights since he never acted in a parental capacity; and (2) under the controlling statute, the first two elements are satisfied based on the record including (i) supported termination of mother's parental rights on ground that children had been removed from mother's care for at least 12 months and (ii) that mother could not remedy the conditions that led to the removal of children; and (3) the trial court failed to adequately address important element relating to needs and welfare of children, which was emotional bond between mother and children, and thus trial court's order denying petition to terminate mother's parental rights was to be vacated and case remanded for further proceedings.
Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

In re L.C., II, 900 A.2d 378 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: After allegations arose about the fourteen year old boy’ sexual acts towards a nine-year old girl, an adjudication of dependency hearing was ordered so his parents relinquished custody to a treatment facility. The question presented was whether a paternal grandmother may participate as party in grandson’s adjudication of dependency hearing, as compared to a custody battle.

Decision of Court: The Court found that the grandmother did not have standing to act in grandson’s dependency proceeding, according to the Juvenile Act of 1999. Since she was not his parent or legal guardian nor was he within her physical custody at the time of the incident, the Court held that she did not have standing. However, the Court allowed her to attend the proceeding silently. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order denying the grandmother standing.
Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

In re O'Brien, 898 A.2d 1075 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: The daughter and executrix of decedent’s will, appealed the trial court’s decision that the decedant’s wife was entitled to a spouse’s survivor portion of the estate. Appellant argued that the lower court erred as a matter of law by finding Decedent’s and Appellee’s postnuptual agreement unenforceable thereby allowing recovery for Appellee’s elective share.
Decision of Court: Affirming the lower court’s holding, this court found that the postnuptual agreement unenforceable. The decedent breached the agreement by liquidating the asset serving as consideration and failed to comply with its terms. Therefore, the Appellee was no longer bound by the agreement and entitled to an elective share from the decedent’s estate. The Court found no error as a matter of law and affirmed.
Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: The issue before the Court was whether the trial court erred when determining which parties involved in a surrogate baby procedure had sta

nding to seek custody of the children born as a result and which parties may seek to terminate another’s parental rights. Appellant, J.F. (“Father”), presented a question for review of whether the trial court erred in holding that D.B. (“gestational carrier”) has standing to seek custody of the triplet boys she carried and delivered, after having taken them from the hospital against Father's wishes when they were eight days old. In a companion case, an action initiated by gestational carrier, Father appeals from the trial court's order terminating the parental rights of J.R. (“egg donor”).

Decision of Court: The Court held that, with regard to the custody matter, Father was entitled to obtain custody of his biological children from the third party gestational carrier who has no biological connection to the children and who took custody of the children in flagrant defiance of Father's wishes. The trial court erred in finding that gestational carrier had in loco parentis status to challenge Father's right to custody. Gestational carrier's defiant conduct precluded such a finding. Moreover, the trial court erred in sua sponte voiding the Surrogacy Contract as contrary to public policy and in naming gestational carrier as the “legal mother”. The order of the trial court awarding primary physical custody, as well as child support, to gestational carrier, with partial custody rights to Father, was vacated and the Court directed that Father was awarded full physical and legal custody of his biological children. Further, the trial court's order terminating egg donor's parental rights was reversed.

Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

InfoSAGE, Inc. v. Mellon Ventures, L.P., 896 A.2d 616 (Pa.Super. 2006)

Issue: Appellant, InfoSAGE, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, appealed from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissing in its entirety Appellant's amended complaint. Specifically, Appellant asked the Court to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist to support its counts sounding in tortious interference with prospective business relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. The issues presented included (1) whether a trial court may properly grant summary judgment against a plaintiff who produces sufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action as to each count in its complaint; (2) whether a trial court may properly grant summary judgment against a plaintiff where the court has not given [the] plaintiff the benefit of construing the evidence of record in the light most favorable to it, nor granted [the] plaintiff the full benefit of all reasonable inferences from such evidence; (3) whether a trial court may properly grant summary judgment against a plaintiff where the court has incorrectly excluded from its consideration, as inadmissible hearsay, probative testimony offered by the plaintiff; and (4)whether a trial court may properly dismiss a plaintiff's complaint in its entirety where the court has failed to consider the evidence of record as it relates to two of the three counts.

Decision of Court: The Court affirmed, based on its conclusion that Appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence establishing necessary elements showing a tortious interference with prospective business relations and breach of fiduciary duty. It agreed that (1) the company did not have a reasonable probability of obtaining third-round financing, and thus did not have a tortious interference claim against venture capital firms, and (2) venture capital firm and its representative on company's board did not breach any fiduciary duties owed to company, when firm was never unjustly enriched by its alleged nefarious dealings.

Position of Judge: Authored opinion.

Collins v. Collins, 897 A.2d 466 (Pa.Super. 2006)
Issue: Appellant, mother, appeals from the trial court’s order denying her petition for relocation and granting appellee, father, primary custody of the parties’ three minor sons. Specifically, Mother asked the Court to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the best interests of the children precluded relocation and the award of primary custody to mother.
Decision of Court: Using the ultimate standard of what is in the best interests of the children, which includes evaluation of all factors relevant to the children’s well-being, the factors all militate in favor of a primary custody award to mother. The Court reversed and remanded.
Position of Judge: Authored opinion.