Case Summaries Hon. Thomas G. Saylor
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Supreme Court, Middle District Case Summaries
Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin, Corp., --- A.2d ----, 2007 WL 528053 (Pa., 2007)
Issue: The Court heard an appeal to determine whether interlocutory appeal as a right arose from a common pleas court’s orders denying summary judgment in consolidated product liability cases, on motions of defendant airplane engine manufacturers grounded on an eighteen –year federal statute of repose. In the underlying civil actions, Appellees, representatives of victims who were killed or injured in an airplane crash in North Lima, Ohio, asserted claims of negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied warranties against Appellants, Textron, Lycoming reciprocating Engine Division, Textron, Inc., and AVCO Corporation, etc. additionally, the complaints averred that Appellants had knowledge of the alleged defects, and engaged in intentional misrepresentation, concealment, and withholding relative to them, included to implicate part of the exceptions to the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) of 1994. Under GARA, claims for death, injury, and property damage involving certain types of aircraft asserted against manufacturers generally are barred if the accident occurred more than eighteen years before the first purchaser received the aircraft.
Decision: The Court held that the common pleas court erred in finding that the rolling provision of GARA exempts Appellees’ claims for the general rule affording repose by virtue of Appellants status as original manufacturer, type certificate holder, and/or designer, with regard to alleged defects not associated with replacement parts that they did not manufacture or supply. Further, the Court held that Section 400 of the Restatement does not give rise to continuing liability on the part of the defendant/manufacturer over and against GARA, with regard to replacement parts that the defendant/manufacturer did not actually supply to the plaintiffs. The Court remanded to common pleas court to consider whether there are material facts in dispute relative to other issues, permissible through additional discovery.
Position of the Judge: Authored opinion.
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Downingtown Area School District v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 913 A.2d 194 (Pa. 2006) Issue: The issue presented was whether the prevailing statutory scheme for tax equalization obviates the common law procedure for asserting a challenge under the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution brought by a taxpayer seeking review of the county’s property tax assessment. The Court granted discretionary review of (1) whether then trial court erred including that provisions of the Assessment Law superceded the methods of determining uniformity by this Court and (2) whether the trial court and Commonwealth Court erred in disregarding Appellant’s uncontradicted testimony. Decision: The Court vacated and remanded. The Court held that the statute, which precluded the uniformity challenge of the common level was within 15% of the established predetermined ratio (EPR), was unconstitutional and the evidence of assessment-to-value ratio of similar shopping centers was admissible in challenging uniformity. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Cohen v. W.C.A.B. (City of Philadelphia) 909 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2006) Issue: The issue presented was whether a workers’ compensation judge was bound to afford preclusive effect to a determination by the Philadelphia Civil Service Commission under Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation provisions regarding a police officer’s petition to reinstate workers’ compensation benefits. Decision of the Court: The Court found that the Workers’ Compensation Judge was not bound by the decision of the Philadelphia Civil Service Commission because it would contravene the desire of the legislature. The order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed and the case was remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, via the Commonwealth Court for consideration of any outstanding issues by the City, and if there were none, then reinstatement of the workers’ compensation judge’s award was proper. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Broussard v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh 907 A.2d 494 (Pa. 2006) Issue: In a land-use dispute, the issue was whether and under what circumstances, an application for a special exception may be granted conditioned upon the applicant’s later compliance with the express requirements for the special exception under the zoning ordinance. Decision of the Court: The Court concluded that where the plan, as submitted, addressed all of the ordinances prerequisites for the special exception sought, and reasonably showed that the property owner was able to fulfill them in accordance with the procedures set forth in the zoning code (as reasonably interpreted by the board), a reviewing court should not be able to reverse the grant of such an exception, solely because some of the items in the plan were to be completed at a later date. Thus, the Court found that the Zoning Board was not required to insist upon the actual presence of an actual, recordable contract at the plan-submission stage, so the Board was not barred from granting the special exception. Affirmed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482 (Pa. 2006) Issue: The Court was presented with a matter relating to the availability and scope of discovery of financial records of a non-party expert medical witness about potential bias. The Court also addressed whether there are appropriate, general boundaries that should define the range of special circumstances that support supplemental discovery from an expert witness on the issue of potential favoritism. Decision of Court: The Court found that trial preparation procedures were adequate and less burdensome than discovery and production of personal financial records. Vacated the orders of the Superior Court and the common pleas court, without prejudice to the common pleas court’s ability to authorize discovery consistent with this opinion. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
In re Estate of Burger, 898 A.2d 547 (Pa. 2006) Issue: Appellant challenged a ruling that she lacked standing as decedent’s brother’s daughter and heir. Appellant claimed that Appellee used undue influence as a full-time caregiver to exploit a confidential relationship and increase her residuary bequests. Appellant sought a judicial determination that such increases be deemed void and the result a partial intestacy, from which Appellant should benefit as the closest person to decedent and fifty-percent intestate heir. Decision of Court: The Court held that the orphan court did not err in finding the Appellant lacked standing to pursue a will contest and affirmed the Superior Court’s order based on the anti-lapse statutes. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Strine v. Com., 894 A.2d 733 (Pa. 2006) Issue: The issue presented was whether giving a bath to a nursing home patient as therapy to relieve bed sores constituted the furnishing of medical services sufficient to trigger the statutory obligations of the former Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund. Decision of Court: The Court found that bathing a patient constituted the furnishing of a medical service which can lead to professional liability under the Malpractice Act. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Chen v. Chen 893 A.2d 87 (Pa. 2006) Issue: The Court addressed a matter of first impression concerning whether a child may bring suit or intervene in an action to enforce provisions of her parents’ property settlement agreement. The Superior Court and the trial court below held that the child in this case could intervene in her mother’s support action because the child was a third party intended beneficiary under her parents’ property settlement agreement pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and adopted by the Court in Guy v. Liederbach,, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa.1983). Decision of Court: The Court found that the lower court erred in concluding that the daughter had a legally enforceable interest to justify intervention. The Court refused to rewrite the agreement and held that the daughter was not an intended beneficiary because recognition of daughter’s right to performance was not appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties. Thus, the order was reversed. Position of Judge: In a concurring opinion, Judge Saylor found that because the contract at issue is a child support agreement, it seemed evident that daughter was the intended beneficiary, at least during her minority.
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Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority v. Lehigh County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 889 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 2005) Issue: The question was whether and to what extent, real property owned by a municipal authority, formed in accordance with the Municipal Authorities Act was immune from local real estate taxation. The Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority filed for tax exemption or immunity in 1999, the Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals granted partial relief by granting tax-exempt status to two of the Authority’s 21 properties. The Authority filed 10 appeals to the common pleas court and the affected taxing bodies intervened. The common pleas court consolidated the appeals for all purposes, including trial. The court denied the authority’s motion for summary judgment seeking blanket tax immunity and granted in part and denied in part the Authority’s request for tax exemption for the ten subject properties. The court also granted in part and denied in part the Authority’s tax appeals. The Authority appealed. The Commonwealth Court affirmed and the Authority appealed again. Decision of the Court: The trial court decided the immunity question as a matter of law without reviewing evidence and then, proceeded to trial on the tax exemption issue, an improper standard was used. Therefore, the action was remanded to the common pleas court for the application of the correct legal standard to be applied. In turn, any parcel deemed to be outside of the scope of the Authority’s tax immunity will be subject to local real estate taxes for the tax years in question only if it was deemed non-exempt in the previous bifurcated trial. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Harsh v. Petroll, 887 A.2d 209 (Pa. 2005) Issue: The question presented concerned the application of joint and several liability in a strict-liability crashworthiness context relative to a fatal motor-vehicle accident. Decision: The Court found that although crashworthiness theory established a basis to support manufacturer liability for enhanced injury, it did not require that a manufacturer be the exclusive cause of such injury, nor does it diminish the causal link that existed between the initial collision and all resultant harm. Since the jury found the defendant’s negligence and design defects were substantial factors in causing the fatalities, the trial court did not err in assessing joint and several liability. Affirmed Commonwealth Court order. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Sienkiewicz v. Com. Dept. of Transp. 883 A.2d 494 (Pa. 2005) Issue: The Court addressed a matter that involved an asserted de facto condemnation arising from the reconfiguration of a highway interchange and associated roadways. Decision: The Court found that unconsummated plans to narrow the direct access to property were insufficient to support a cause of action relative to an asserted de facto condemnation in the absence of an actual interference with direct access. Additionally, the Court held that the road closure that did not restrict direct access to property was not relevant to the interference with direct access claim. Commonwealth Court’s order was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Gallagher v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. 883 A.2d 550 (Pa. 2005) Issue: The Court was presented with an appeal about whether a trial court presiding over a civil negligence case erred in refusing to bifurcate trial to avoid exposing jurors to information from which it could be inferred that the plaintiff may have received some compensation for his injuries from a collateral source. Decision of the Court: The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to bifurcate the employer identification question and other trial issues. The Superior Court’s order was vacated and the matter was remanded for consideration of the remaining issues raised and properly presented on appeal to the Superior Court. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Issue: The question presented was whether jurisdiction over claims for reimbursement under the Pennsylvania Medical Assistance Program that were filed prior to 2003 lays into the Board of Claims. Decision of the Court: The Court found that by pursuing the claims outside administrative appeals process and in the forum of choice, the Medical Center risked that the Department’s position relative to jurisdiction in subsequent litigation. The Court rejected the argument that the Department of Public Welfare should be estopped and held that the Board of Claims for reimbursement under medical assistance prior to amendment passed afterwards which deprived the Board of jurisdiction. Affirmed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
In re Barnes Foundation 871 A.2d 792 (Pa. 2005) Issue: The Court granted applications seeking an exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction relative to an appeal challenging orphans’ court approval of the restructuring of the Barnes Foundation. The dispositive legal issue was related to the timeliness of the appeal. Students enrolled in the Barnes Foundation program sought to intervene in proceedings relative to amendments to the charter and bylaws. The Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County denied the intervention and approved the restructuring. The student appealed the final decree. The Superior Court denied the Foundation’s motion to dismiss appeal. Emergency application extraordinary relief was granted. Decision of the Court: The Court held that the student, Appellant, failure to attain intervenor status before the orphans’ court foreclosed his ability to file a cognizable appeal relative to the court’s final decree. The Court reasoned that permitting an appeal after the final judgment would risk interference with trial court proceedings taken after the denial of an intervention. Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Position of Judge: Authored opinion. Issue: The Court considered the dispute between Appellant, Philadelphia Suburban Water Company (Aqua Pennsylvania), and Appellee, Chester Water Authority, a municipal water authority, about the Public Utility Commission’s Approval of an extension of service to Aqua PA to a new site, which CWA wanted to serve. The PUC granted certificate of public convenience to a private water company to supply water service to a new site. The Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded. Aqua PA appealed. Decision of Court: The Court held that
the PUC was not required to conduct hearing on every application for
certificate of public convenience and the PUC did not abuse discretion in
declining to conduct a hearing. The order of the Commonwealth Court is
reversed and the matter is remanded for reinstatement of the PUC’s order.
Jurisdiction relinquished. |
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Issue: The issue presented in the consolidated appeals was whether the relinquishment during collective bargaining, of a scheduled, future salary increase for employees, in return for a lump-sum payment by employer into a pension fund for current and future retirees, constituted an “employee contribution” relative to Pennsylvania ’s unemployment compensation statute and applicable federal law. Decision of Court: The Court held that for the purposes of Section 404(d)(2)(ii) of the Commonwealth’s Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. § 804(d)(2)(ii), an employee contribution signifies a direct contribution made by payroll deduction or otherwise from an employee’s personal funds. The Court distinguished a direct contribution as one made by payroll deduction or otherwise from employee’s personal funds whereas a wage agreement that results in increased employer contributions to a retirement plan in exchange for surrender in wages does not constitute a direct contribution to the pension plan by the employees. Thus, it affirmed the Commonwealth Court order reversing the orders of the Boards and remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Pratt v. St. Christopher's Hosp. 866 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2005) Issue: The issue presented concerned the application of the “no-impeachment rule” governing the admissibility of post-verdict testimony by jurors. Relative to an underlying medical malpractice action. Decision: The Court adopted an objective test to determine prejudice in instances of post-verdict allegations about extraneous information and/or outside influences affecting deliberations. Further, the Court deemed the procedure and disposition of claims within the authority of the trial court. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing an evidentiary hearing following information discovered after jurors’ discharge. The Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Department of Public Welfare v. Schultz, 855 A.2d 753 (Pa. 2004) Issue: The issue is whether a parent may recover for non-pecuniary losses under the Wrongful Death Act for the death of a child. Appellant, executrix of the estate and mother of Steven Shultz, an adult patient at Clarks Summit State Hospital, appealed from the order of the Commonwealth Court reversing the order of the trial court denying appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Appellant instituted a wrongful death and survival action against hospital when decedent walked out of unlocked door and froze to death before a search found him the next day. Parties settled the survival action and filed motions for judgment on the pleadings to resolve the question of whether or not a parent can recover non-pecuniary losses resulting from a child’s death within the context of a wrongful death action and whether sovereign immunity is a bar to recovery against appellees. The trial court denied the motion finding judgment on the pleadings inappropriate, since it is not a clear matter of law. The trial court certified the interlocutory order for immediate appeal and the Commonwealth Court granted appellees’ request to appeal. The Commonwealth Court reversed, agreeing appellant’s action was not barred by sovereign immunity, but it concluded that a parent may not recover for non-pecuniary losses under the Wrongful Death Act. Decision of Court: Given the plain language of the Sovereign Immunity Act, the Court held that a parent may not recover non-pecuniary losses from the Commonwealth resulting from the death of a child as barred by the Act. The Commonwealth Court’s order prohibiting recovery of those damages was affirmed. Position of Judge: Saylor filed a concurring opinion in which Nigro joined. J. Saylor, absent the circumstances of this action, recognized his tendency towards a broader view of consortium, including filial and parental consortium under the general definition in Black’s Law Dictionary. |
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Vitac Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Rozanc) 854 A.2d 481 (Pa. 2004) Issue: The issue presented was whether paraprofessional fees may be recovered as a component of an award of attorneys’ fees under the PA’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Decision of Court: The Court held that
the term “attorney’s fee” in Section 440(a) of the Workers’ compensation Act
includes reasonable fees for legal services rendered by paraprofessionals
such as paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates. The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed as it was held that these fees are not recoverable and the
fee award of the WCJ (workers’ compensation judge) was reinstated. |
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Issue: The court addressed substantive and procedural questions relative to the domestic effect of a guardianship judgment issued by a court of another nation. Decision of the Court: The Court found that without a statutory procedure for transfer of an extra-national guardianship judgment, a foreign guardian seeking comity in Pennsylvania needed to secure the foreign court's approval for the extra-territorial extension or transfer of the authority as guardian; should implicate the Pennsylvania judicial process under the guardianship provisions of the Probate Code, in an attempt to comply as closely with all essential, procedural requirements, namely due and specific notice to the asserted ward; and should seek recognition of the foreign court's decree in the context of such Pennsylvania guardianship proceeding. The Pennsylvania court of common pleas was held to be responsible for ensuring procedural compliance, which could necessitate additional judgments competency and/or best interests. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. American Financial Mortg. Corp.,855 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2004) Issue: The Court addressed a commercial conversion action between a bank after the bank mistakenly applied a set-off against the general deposit account and a company asserting a third-party interest ownership and/or perfected security interests in the account proceeds. The Court reasoned that the common pleas court should have distinguished the central question as whether Pioneer effectuated an absolute reservation of title in the second loan portfolio and its proceeds (i.e. a true bailment), versus whether it possessed a perfected security interest (or something of lesser priority). Decision of the Court: The Court found that at most, the bank received inquiry notice of a potential third-party interest when AFMC referred to the account as the “settlement account” and was then, bound to conduct a reasonable investigation. After an investigation was conducted by CoreStates at which point the relevant facts were uncovered, the facts revealed that the error or mistake did not rise to bank liability for conversion for wrongful set-off. The Superior Court order was reversed and the matter remanded for entry of judgment nonwithstanding the verdict in favor of CoreStates. Also, the Court held that a new trial was not necessary. Position of Judge: Authored opinion. |
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In re Bryant 852 A.2d 1193 (Pa. 2004) Issue: Relative to nominations filing for elections, the controlling issue of the statutorily prescribed seven-day deadline for advancing specific substantive grounds for challenging a nomination petition, Appellant and candidate, Bryant, lodged with the Secretary of the Commonwealth a Democratic nomination for the House of Representatives. In Commonwealth Court, Appellee, Rosita Youngblood, challenged Appellant’s petition on failure to disclosure financial interests in compliance with the Ethics Act, after first challenging the petition’s signature and affidavit. The Commonwealth Court sustained the objection. Appellant/Candidate challenged the order. Decision of Court: The Court held that
a nomination petition is deemed valid where it is unchallenged within the
statutory period. Thus, a candidate’s noncompliance with the Ethics Act was
not deemed grounds to set aside a petition outside the statutory period.
Order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed. |
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Tritt v. Cortes, 851 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2004) Issue: The Court addressed the scope of notary
public education requirements when Appellant filed a petition for review
challenging the Secretary of the Commonwealth’s decision to refuse her
application for reappointment as notary public because she did not complete
continuing educational requirements six months prior to filing. |
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AMP Inc. v. Com., 852 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 2004) |
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Issue: Arising from an audit, the issue presented was whether the manufacturing exclusion from assessment under Pennsylvania ’s statutory scheme of use taxation reaches certain packaging and storage equipment and materials purchased for use by manufacturer of component parts at an in-state distribution facility. Decision of Court: The Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of AMP’s argument that post-production packaging and distribution activities at distribution center were not manufacturing operations, and thus materials and equipment purchased for use at that center were subject to tax. Position of Judge: Authored opinion. Issue: Appellant, Burger, instituted an action against Appellee, the school district, seeking reinstatement of his position as school superintendent as well as pay and benefits, after Appellees suspended him for accusations of sexual harassment and retaliatory conduct against other employees. The Court addressed whether despite the absence of express statutory authority, a school board possesses implied authority to suspend a school superintendent accused of improper conduct on an interim basis, without pay and benefits, pending a termination hearing. The Court addressed Appellant’s request for mandamus relief. The Court of Common Pleas granted peremptory writ in mandamus, rescinding superintendent’s suspension and restoring his compensation and benefits. The school district and Board of Directors appealed. The Commonwealth Court reversed and the superintendent appealed. Decision of Court: Order of the Commonwealth Court was affirmed. The Court held that the School Code’s removal provision pertaining to superintendents does not divest school boards of their implied authority to suspect officials accused of serious misconduct, even without pay and benefits, within the constraints of procedural due process. Position of Judge: Authored opinion. |
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McKinley v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 838 A.2d 700 (Pa. 2003) Issue: Following the order to remand to Commonwealth Court for additional review of the validity of an administrative driver’s license suspension under the Implied Consent Law, arising from the extraterritorial encounter between Appellant and a Harrisburg International Airport Police corporal. A divided Commonwealth court determined that the site of the encounter, although beyond the corporal’s territorial jurisdiction, did not affect the legal effect of Appellant’s refusal, thereby reaffirming its prior disposition. Decision of Court: The Court held that without express legislative authority granting police power, the Implied Consent Law could not be implemented outside territorial boundaries. Reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and the common pleas’ order invalidating the license suspension was reinstated. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 830 A.2d 941 (Pa. 2003). Issue: Arising from the UPS’s actions to seek the Commonwealth Court’s enforcement of a previous decision sustaining the carrier’s challenge to a type of methodology used by the PUC to allocate the regulatory expenses among utilities for assessment purposes as required by statute. The UPS alleged that it filed an action for refund reasoning that the Commission had assessed its amounts that were calculated in violation of the Public Utility Code, the Commonwealth Court entered judgment in its favor by finding the Commission’s assessments against the Code, and was remanded for a recalculation. Thus, UPS invoked waiver and collateral estoppel arguments against the Commission during the course of the proceedings and averred it was thereby, entitled to a refund under the previous order. Decision of Court: The Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order pertaining to the enforcement phase of the proceedings and remanded for recalculations of the relevant assessments. It held that the direct expenses were to be calculated according to their original form, as allocated among the Utility Group, and indirect expenses were to be calculated among the same Utility Groups for each assessment year, per Section 510(b)(2), in the same proportion as the percentage of gross intrastate operate revenue it carries for that year. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 829 A.2d 297 (Pa. 2003) Issue: The Court addressed an appeal concerning the evaluation of the $300,000 “per claimant” limitation embodied in the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act. Decision of Court: Affirmed Superior Court’s order, authored by Lally-Green, J. The Court held that the Superior Court correctly determined that each of the five individuals, including the surviving spouse of the deceased and children, was a proper claimant for purposes of the Act so long their claims arose out of and are within the coverage provided by the policy, and the common pleas court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the Association was properly reversed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Harrisburg School Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079 (Pa. 2003) Issue: The Court reviewed a direct appeal from an order of the Commonwealth Court invalidating an amendment to the Pennsylvania Educational Empowerment Act which would allow the mayors of certain medium-sized cities within the Commonwealth to assume control of failing school districts. The primary issue presented was whether the amendment in question constituted special legislation in violation of Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Decision of Court: The Court concluded that provisions of the Act were consistent with Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court also held that the Act did not change the form of government in violation of the Constitution. The order of the Commonwealth court was reversed and the matter was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2003) Issue: The Court addressed three issues relating to (1) the procedure for perfecting a post-trial appeal of a pre-trial order granting summary judgment to one, but not all the defendants (2) the scope of parental duty to supervise a child when parents have joint custody and (3) the adequacy of the jury’s award for damages. The issues arose from a complaint alleging negligence filed by Appellee’s parents on behalf of their thirteen year old son after he sustained injuries when N.R., a fourteen year old boy, shot Appellee with his BB gun. Decision of Court: The Court reasoned that the duty to exercise reasonable care to control a child must be limited and arises when a parent at a relevant time knows or should know of the need to exercise parental control and has the ability/opportunity to do so. It held that neither physical custody nor shared legal custody changed the standard about parental liability, so the Court held that the trial court properly awarded summary judgment to J.R. and that the Superior Court erred in reversing that order. Although a Rule 1925(b) statement was not filed, the Superior Court docketing statement included the prior summary judgment order, so the issue was not waived. Concerning damages, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find the jury verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to shock the court’s sense of justice. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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County of Northampton v. Department of Community and Economic Development, 825 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 2003) Issue: The issue presented was whether absent well-pleaded allegations of fraud, the Dept. of Community and Economic Development was precluded from conducting evidentiary hearings in proceedings under the Local Government Unit Debt Act. Decision of Court: Neither the Debt Act nor its supporting regulations requires a well-pleaded averment of fraud as an essential predicate to an evidentiary hearing in debt proceedings. The Court held that the Department has jurisdiction and authority under the Debt Act and its associated administrative regulations to conduct evidentiary hearings to resolve material factual controversies arising from procedural and substantive matters within the purview of the Act. The order of the Commonwealth Court was vacated, and further proceedings were deemed moot. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Borough of Ellwood City v. Ellwood City Police Dept. Wage and Policy Unit, 825 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2003) Issue: In the arena, of municipal police pension contributions and funding, the Court considered an asserted conflict between the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and requirements of the Police Pension Fund and Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Acts. Decision of Court: Affirmed. The Commonwealth Court was correct in determining that the arbitrator’s decision defining actuarial soundness in a manner inconsistent with the relevant statutory funding requirements exceeded his powers, and the resulting award was properly vacated. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Sharpe v. St. Luke's Hosp., 821 A.2d 1215 (Pa. 2003) Issue: The Court addressed whether a hospital which collects samples for drug testing under a contract with an employer, owes a duty of care to the employee undergoing that testing. Decision of Court: The Hospital owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care with regard to collection and handling of her urine specimen for the employment-related drug testing. The Court found it was up to the jury to determine whether the Hospital breached such duty. Order of the Superior Court was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Zeglin v. Gahagen, 812 A.2d 558 (Pa. 2002) Issue: In an appeal involving a boundary dispute, the question presented was whether privity of estate between succeeding landowners is required to support tacking periods of ownership to form the requisite twenty-one-year period under acquiescence theory. Decision of Court: The court found tacking was permitted upon sufficient and credible proof of delivery of possession of land not within, but contiguous to property described by deed of conveyance, which as previously claimed and occupied by the grantor and was taken by the grantee as successor in interest. Order of Supreme Court was reversed and the case was remanded for reinstatement of the final decree of the common pleas court. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Marlowe) 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002) Issue: The Court addressed an appeal concerning the application, in the administrative law setting, of what was termed the capricious disregard standard of appellate review. Decision of Court: The Court found that it was most significant that the sole evidence of times of injury onset and aggravation derived from Claimant's accounts and testimony, and that Claimant's credibility was therefore an essential linchpin to the central question of work relatedness. Since a determination of capricious disregard was unwarranted, the orders of the WCAB and Commonwealth Court are reversed, and the matter remanded for reinstatement of the initial order of the WCJ. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Davis v. Chester Upland School Dist., 786 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2001) Issue: The Court addressed an appeal by allowance from an order of Commonwealth Court which affirmed in part and reversed in part a declaratory judgment issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Appellees filed an action in common pleas seeking declaratory judgment that they rather than Appellants, should have been hired to fill positions based on qualifications, seniority, and compliance with the Public School Code. For those reasons, it held that Chester Upland violated provisions of the Public School Code by not rehiring appellees. Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s order in part and affirmed in part relative to the rehiring of appellees. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in allowing appellees, who are subject to collective bargaining agreement that contains a grievance procedure, to pursue a declaratory judgment action regarding their work-related complaint. Decision of Court: The Court held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to proceed because there had been no decision by an arbitrator as to the arbitrability of the dispute. Thus, the Commonwealth Court erred in upholding the trial court’s issuance of declaratory judgment. Position of Judge: Saylor, J. filed a dissenting opinion in which Nigro and Newman, JJ. Joined: Saylor would reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order and overturn the common pleas judgment on the strength of the general policy favoring arbitration alone. Instead, it would have been preferable to analyze in terms of Wright before reversing and would have dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted since the Employer’s argument failed to address Wright.
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Hoenisch v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing 785 A.2d 969 (Pa. 2001) Issue: In this case the Court considered whether a conviction pursuant to the provision in the North Carolina Impaired Driving Statute, prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle when the driver has a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or more, provides a sufficient basis for a reciprocal driver's license suspension in Pennsylvania. Decision
of Court: This in our view bears
the requisite similarity to Article IV(a)(2)'s requirement that an individual
be under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug, which encompasses
any mental or physical condition resulting from the consumption of alcohol
that substantially impairs the normal faculties essential to the safe
operation of an automobile. Such construction is
consistent with other jurisdictions. The court in Harrington considered North Carolina's prior per se method threshold of .10 percent, which was amended in 1993 to .08 percent. In
giving effect to the North Carolina conviction, we recognize that our
decisions in this area implicate matters of degree. While Hoenisch's conviction was established
pursuant to a per se method that accords evidentiary effect to a
lower blood alcohol content threshold than that allowed by Pennsylvania's per se method, the Compact anticipates such variance by recognizing a general
driving under the influence offense and permitting effect to be given to laws
of a substantially similar nature. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581 (Article IV(c)); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c)
(allowing for the liberal construction of a statute to effect its object and
promote justice). Furthermore, such construction
serves an underlying policy of the Compact, specifically, consideration of
the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws as a condition to the
maintenance of a license in a party state. See 75
Pa.C.S. § 1581 (Article I(b)(2)).The order of the Commonwealth Court is
affirmed. O’Rouke v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 778 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2001). Issue: Arising from a demotion subsequent to a prison employee’s, report of stolen meat products and mismanagement of the culinary department, Appellant directly appealed the Commonwealth Court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for review under Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. The Court addressed whether adverse personnel action taken against a public employee was a direct result of a good-faith report of wrongdoing or waste violated the Whistleblower Law, absent a retaliatory motive by the employer. Decision of Court: The Court held that the Department did not rebut the employee’s prima facie evidence that he was demoted based on his whistleblower report and thus, was liable to employee for retaliation. Position
of Judge: Authored
opinion. |
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Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exchange 793 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2002) Issue: The question presented was whether technical requirements imposed upon insurers under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act to effectuate a first named insured’s decision to refuse uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage influenced acceptance of coverage at designated policy limits. Decision of Court: The Court held that Section 1731(c.1) of the MVFRL applied only if insurer attempts to enforce outright waiver/rejection of UM/UIM coverage. Thus, Section 1731(c.1) did not affect enforcement of insured’s Section 1734 specific-limits election, although multiple elections were contained on a single page, including unrealized Section 1731(b) and (c) waiver/rejection language also appeared. Thus, the provisions of the MVFRL that required rejection of UM/UIM coverage on separate sheets of paper did not impede enforcement of insureds’ specific-limits elections. Affirmed Superior Court’s Order. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Kozura v. Tulpehocken Area School Dist. 791 A.2d 1169 (Pa. 2002) Issue: The issues presented related to an aggrieved employee’s capacity to challenge arbitration awards and specifically, the grievance and arbitration procedures pursuant to a particular public-sector collective bargaining agreement. Kozura, a public school teacher suspended due to complaints about his teaching style and subsequently, terminated following notice and hearing, the union representing Kozura filed a grievance on his behalf pursuant to the governing collective bargaining agreement seeking reinstatement, back pay, and corresponding benefits. Parties presented to an arbitrator who issued an award reinstating him, reasoning no just cause existed for termination, but denied back pay and benefits reasoning his classroom conduct warranted suspension without pay. Decision of Court: Since neither the collective bargaining agreement nor the Public School Employees’ Act does not explicitly state who may appeal arbitration awards, the Court found no grounds to prevent the Appellant from appealing the adverse arbitration award. Reversed order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded matter consistent with the opinion. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Gaeta v. Ridley School Dist., 788 A.2d 363 (Pa. 2002) Issue: The issue presented was whether a school district seeking competitive bids for public construction projects was required to reject low bids, namely ones that failed to satisfy an advertised surety quality rating requirement. Initially, Gaeta, a taxpayer within the school district, sought equitable relief through a permanent injunction against awarding the contract to the construction company that submitted the low bid that did not meet quality rating standards. The common pleas court denied injunctive relief reasoning that the taxpayer injury was greater and would have detrimentally delayed the project if the contract was awarded to another bidder. Presented with Gaeta’s appeal, the Commonwealth Court deemed maintaining the competitive bidding process’ integrity through compliance with surety requirements and pursuant to legislative intent far outweighs the cost saved by awarding the contract to the lowest bid and lowest responsive bid. The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded at which point Gaeta appealed. Decision of Court: Generally, the Court discouraged variances from public works bidding instructions and specifications and at a minimum implicate the government’s discretionary authority to reject non-compliant bids. Thus, the Court found that the evidence within the record did not reveal such materialilty or competitive advantage to compel bid rejection. As such, the Court rejected Gaeta’s request for permanent injunctive relief. The Commonwealth Court’s order was reversed and the matter was remanded. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Com. v. Beam 788 A.2d 357 (Pa.2002) Issue: The issue presented was whether the Department of Transportation can seek to enjoin the operation of an unlicensed airport where it was not specifically authorized by the controlling statute. Decision: The Court held that the General Assembly implicitly conferred upon the Department the capacity to seek redress in a judicial forum to retrain operation of an unlicensed airport. The Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Lititz Mutual Insurance Co. v. Steely, 785 A.2d 975 (Pa. 2001) Issue: The issue presented was whether a pollution exclusion clause in a commercial general liability insurance policy precluded coverage for injuries allegedly caused by the ingestion and/ or inhalation of lead-based paint. After living in two different rental properties under separate ownership, minor’s mother commenced an action on her son’s behalf against the Steelys and the Yeagers alleging negligence, breach of implied warranty of habitability, and misrepresentation for injuries sustained in the form of lead poisoning and neurodevelopmental delay caused by the lead paint within the residences. Appellee, Lititz Mutual, sought declaratory judgment to determine that claims were not covered under the policy’s “pollution exclusion” held by the insured, the Steelys. Concluding that the exclusion was ambiguous, the trial court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the insured, the Yeagers and minor, Brown, joined the insured’s in their motion for summary judgment. After oral argument, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for summary judgment by finding that the insurer had a duty to defend the insured, but dismissed with prejudice the parties’ request for ruling on the insurer’s duty to indemnify. Decision of Court: Reversing the Superior Court’s order, the Court held that the exclusionary language did not resolve ambiguities in the language and thereby interpreted in favor of insured. Thus, it held that the pollution exclusion did not preclude coverage for the alleged injuries. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Issue: The Court allowed an appeal to consider the timeliness of a notice to an employer of a work-related partial hearing loss under Section 311 of the Workers' Compensation Act. Decision of Court: Since the Court found no statutory basis for limiting
the effect of Section 308(c)(8)(ix) to calculation of benefits
determinations, it concluded that, pursuant to such provision, Claimant
satisfied the notice requirement of Section 311 concurrent with the filing of
his claim petition. Although the opinion
represented the view of a plurality, all Justices were aligned in terms of
the result. Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court was affirmed. |
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Mulligan v. Piczon, 779 A.2d 1143 (Pa.
2001) |
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Vlasic Farms Inc. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. 777 A.2d 80 (Pa. 2001) Issue: The Court considered whether mushroom harvesters are agricultural laborers and such, excluded from coverage under the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act. A union filed a petition with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) seeking to represent full and part-time employees involved in mushroom production at Vlasic Farms in an unfair labor practice charge against Vlasic (Employer). The PLRB hearing examiner issued a proposed decision and order, reasoning that the PLRB consistently distinguished mushroom workers from agricultural laborers. Employer filed an appeal to the Commonwealth Court arguing that the PLRB erred in exercising jurisdiction over the mushroom workers. Relying on the rationale of Blue Mountain and deferring to the PLRB’s expertise in interpreting the governing statute, the Commonwealth Court held that mushroom production, as similar to other horticultural activities, did not constitute agriculture. Decision of Court: Under the pertinent provisions of the PLRB styled after a federal statute, the mushroom workers were not considered agricultural laborers. Since the Legislature did not modify the workers’ status and the PLRB maintained a consistent and reasonable interpretation of the statute, the Court enforced that interpretation. Affirmed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Richards v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review 768 A.2d 852 (Pa. 2001) Issue: The Court addressed whether an unemployment compensation claimant, who had been receiving workers' compensation benefits, should rely upon pre-injury wages to establish the base year for purposes of calculating unemployment compensation benefits, where it had been determined that the claimant had recovered from his injury and should not have been receiving workers' compensation benefits for a period of more than one year. Decision
of Court: Although Claimant
received workers' compensation benefits until June 4, 1997, the WCJ's decision established that the work-related disability had ceased as of November 21, 1995, and that Claimant could have returned to work as of that date. Thus,
Claimant's inability to establish a base year in the period immediately
preceding his application for unemployment compensation benefits did not
result from a compensable, work-related injury, although he received benefits
during that time. Consistent with the statutory scheme of the WCA, the Court
concluded that Claimant could not establish a moveable base year that
pre-dates his 1995 work injury and, thus,
did not satisfy the eligibility requirements of the UC Law. The order of the Commonwealth
Court was reversed.
Simmons v. Luallen, 563 Pa. 589, 763 A.2d 810, 2000 WL 1804528, December 11, 2000 Issue: The issue presented concerned the standard for opening a judgment of non pros entered for failing to file a complaint. Decision of Court: Since Appellant filed a petition to open and strike judgment attaching to it a copy of her complaint within the ten-day appeal period, the procedural requirements of Rule 237.3 were satisfied. Appellant alleged Appellee violated the lease terms causing damage, supported by attaching lease to the complaint. Since the Appellant’s complaint stated a valid cause of action upon which relief may be granted, the trial court should have opened judgment and permitted her to file a complaint. Thus, the order of the Superior Court was reversed, judgment of non pros was vacated, and the matter was remanded. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Lincoln Philadelphia Realty Associates I v. Board of Revision of Taxes of City and County of Philadelphia 758 A.2d 1178 (Pa. 2000) Issue: The Court addressed issues concerning exemptions from local real estate taxation granted to Appellees, Philadelphia taxpayers, by Appellant, the Board of Revision of Taxes of the City and County of Philadelphia. Decision: The Court found that the taxpayers’ challenges were untimely and the City did not waive arguments on appeal by failing to appear at the hearings before the Board. Instead, the Court found that pursuant to the First Class County Assessment Law, each taxpayer could have filed an appeal from such notice and thereby effected a challenge to the commencement date of the exemptions, but none did. Thus, taxpayers’ failure to appeal from the first of the annual assessment notices at the latest, renders there subsequent appeals untimely and deprives this and the lower courts of jurisdiction to grant relief requested in those appeals. The order of the Commonwealth Court reversing the Order of the Court of Common Pleas was reversed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Stanek v. W.C.A.B. (Greenwich Collieries) 756 A.2d 661 (Pa. 2000) Issue: The Court was asked to determine the claimant’s burden in seeking total disability benefits in workers’ compensation actions, after one has exhausted entitlement to compensation for partial disability. Decision
of Court: The
Court found that since claimant ceased work during the period of eligibility
for partial disability benefits and was physically capable of work of some
kind, benefits were not warranted in the absence of credible evidence
indicating why such work was unavailable to him. The Court affirmed. |
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Stewart v. W.C.A.B. (Pa. Glass Sand/US Silica) 756 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2000) Issue: The issue presented was whether expiration of the 500-week period during which a claimant retains eligibility to receive workers' compensation for partial disability forecloses a subsequent claim for total disability upon deterioration of the claimant's physical condition. Decision of Court: Since Claimant filed his modification petition within three years after the final payment under the parties' supplemental agreement for compensation, the modification petition was timely, and the 500-week period under Section 306(b) does not operate as an impediment to relief. The order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The availability of a post-500-week claim for total disability was based on a straightforward, plain-meaning interpretation of the relevant statutory provision and consistent with the remedial purpose and humanitarian objective of the Act. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
Issue: The Court considered the nature and scope of a contractual arbitration provision in an automobile insurance policy. Decision: The Court held that where an insurer has drafted the UIM provisions of a policy to provide, without exception, for common law arbitration of “coverage disputes” between the insurer and a “covered person”, arbitrators ultimately decide whether a particular claimant is a “covered person” and that decision would not be reversed for error of law. Reversed the order of the Superior Court which vacated the judgments entered in the arbitration award. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Conner v. Quality Coach, Inc., 750 A.2d 823 (Pa. 2000) Issue: This appeal required the Court to determine the applicability and parameters of the government contractor defense in a products liability case involving a non-military contract with a Commonwealth agency. Specifically, Appellant argued that the Superior Court improperly supplanted the requirement that a contractor seeking to avail itself of a government immunity defense must demonstrate that it warned the government about defects or dangers involved in the design or use of a product of which the contractor was or should have been aware. Decision
of Court: The order of the
Superior Court sustaining the grant of summary judgment in favor of Quality
Coach on the basis of the government contractor defense was reversed, and the
case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The
Court held the Commonwealth’s argument that it may indirectly bear increased
costs in procurements from the private sector did not justify a judicial rule
of law broadly exempting government contractors from tort liability.
Further, since the case did not arise out of a public works project, which is
the traditional settings for application of the Ference Valley Forge defense.
It found that there was no privileged relationship with the Commonwealth
aside from its status as a contractor to the Commonwealth, and participated
in important design decisions concerning the alleged defective devices, the
statutory provisions do not support a decision to grant defendant sovereign
immunity.
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Aldridge v. Edmunds 750 A.2d 292 (Pa. 2000) Issue: In a medical malpractice action arising out of
the death of Appellants’ infant born with a heart defect that remained
undiagnosed until almost a year later, the issue presented concerned the use
of authoritative texts during the course of an expert witness's direct
testimony. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Stellar Const., Inc. v. Sborz, 748 A.2d 667 (Pa. 2000) Issue: In a breach of contract action, the issue presented was whether, following issuance of an award in a compulsory judicial arbitration proceeding, the thirty-day period within which a notice of appeal may be filed commences when entry is made on the docket concerning such issuance or upon entry of the required notation regarding provision of notice. Decision of Court: The Court held that the date of entry of an order for purposes of the Pa.R.C.P 1308 was the day on which the prothonotary makes the required notation on the docket reflecting the notice of entry of the arbitration award has been provided as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1307(a)(3). Order of the Superior Court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Triangle Bldg. Center v. W.C.A.B. (Linch), 746 A.2d 1108 (Pa. 2000) Issue: The Court was presented with the issue of whether temporary layoff of a workers' compensation claimant from concurrent employment precludes assessment of his concurrent earnings experience within the average weekly wage calculation. Decision of Court: The employer here, however, did not seek redress for overlapping benefits, but rather, urged that the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits should always preclude a finding of any ongoing employment relationship in the context of Section 309(e), no matter how apparent it may be that such earnings from the concurrent employment would contribute to a valid forecast of future earnings loss. The Court found that the General Assembly, however, had not established such a categorical rule, and for policy reasons declined to accord the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits by virtue of a temporary layoff controlling significance in the Section 309(e) context. The order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed. Position
of Judge: Authored
opinion. |
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Wilson Partners, L.P. v. Com., Bd. of Finance and Revenue 737 A.2d 1215 (Pa.1999) Issue: In consolidated direct appeals, Appellants presented constitutional challenges to the imposition of a tax at the one-percent rate established by the Pennsylvania Realty Transfer Tax Act within the context of a real estate transfer in which one party to the transaction is exempt. Decision of Court: The Court recognized that parties dealing with the federal government encounter a degree of differential treatment in terms of the legal incidence of taxation under the Act. However, the Court found the difference was without constitutional import, since the economic burden which they bear was deemed equivalent. Further, the Court also adopted the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that the taxing scheme under the Act was grounded in a rational basis, as it functions in a non-discriminatory manner to ensure that equal revenues will be collected for all non-excluded transfers of real estate occurring within the Commonwealth. The judgment of the Commonwealth Court was affirmed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Hayes v. Mercy Health Corp. 739 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1999) Issue: The Court addressed whether the confidentiality provisions of the Peer Review Protection Act applied to an internal hospital proceeding in which a physician challenged his own peer review process in an action in which a doctor sought to enjoin hospital from destroying a tape recording of meeting of hospital’s medical board which approved suspension of physician. Decision of Court: The Court found that the “Act” did not apply to internal hospital proceedings in which doctor challenged his own peer review process. Affirmed the trial court. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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AT & T v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com'n, 737 A.2d 201 (Pa.1999) Issue: In consolidated appeals, the Court addressed the manner in which the Public Utility Commission allocated costs of alterations to rail-highway crossings between a transportation public utility and affected parties. The action arose from the relocation of the telecommunications facilities of Appellees, AT&T and Sprint, consisting of fiber optic cables and associated equipment due to alterations to three rail-highway crossings in Scranton, as well as to a 3,600 foot railroad tunnel running beneath a state highway and Nicholson Township. Decision of Court: The Commonwealth Court’s decision was reversed and the order of the PUC reinstated. The matter was remanded to the Commission for the issuance of factual findings, conclusions of law and analysis pertinent to its decision concerning the scope of its jurisdiction over the Nicholson Tunnel and appellate jurisdiction was preserved in the Commonwealth Court on the question in the interim. The Court found that the Commission employed sufficient analysis to support its cost allocation, relied upon facts supported by substantial evidence, and did not commit an abuse of discretion or engage in arbitrary or capricious decision making. The Court declined to impose a more rigorous standard in expressing its reasons for cost-allocation determinations would unnecessarily infringe upon the discretionary aspect of the Commission’s decision, and impact upon the legislative policies favoring protection of the public safety and the expeditious allocation of costs in a fair manner. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Frazier v. City of Philadelphia 735 A.2d 113 (Pa.1999) Issue: The question presented concerned the timeliness of a civil appeal filed seven months after docketing of the final judgment order, but within thirty days after notation upon the docket that notice of such order was provided pursuant to Pa.R.C.P 236(b). Decision of Court: Although notice of the judgment was received because there was no corresponding entry in the docket, formal of the order did not occur under the rules and the appeal period was not triggered. No effect was given to the prothonotary’s attempt to post-date the corrective docket entry as it would be in circumvention to the rules. Since the appeal was perfected within thirty days after the actual notation upon the docket pursuant to Pa.R.C.P 236(b), the appeal was timely. Order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed and the case was remanded to the Commonwealth Court for consideration of the appeal on its merits. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Madison Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100 (Pa.1999) Issue: In this declaratory judgment action, the issue is whether a pollution exclusion clause in a policy of commercial general liability insurance issued to Appellant, Madison Construction Company, by Appellee, Harleysville, relieves Harleysville of its obligation to defend Madison in the underlying personal injury action. Decision: The Court concluded that, as did the en banc Superior Court, the pollution exclusion clause operates to bar coverage in the present action. Affirmed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 1113 (Pa.1999) Issue: On a single issue of first impression, the Court addressed whether Article III, Section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provided in pertinent part that “no bill shall be passed giving any extra compensation to any public officer, servant, [or] employee…after services shall have been rendered or contract made,” operate to prohibit a municipality from granting raises to municipal employees who are already covered by employment contracts. When the Borough of Leetsdale refused to pay the salary increases, three police officers and the Wage and Policy Committee (Appellants) filed a breach in contract action against the Borough regarding the bargaining agreement entered into by a political subdivision of the Commonwealth. Decision of Court: The court held that the principles embodied within Article III, Section 26’s circumscription of the General Assembly’s legislative authority relative to the appropriation of funds from the state treasury apply with equal force to the municipalities as regards the appropriation of funds from local treasuries. Affirmed Commonwealth Court order. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa.1999) Issue: The issue presented was whether the presumption of paternity barred Appellant, Strauser, from seeking to establish on the basis of blood tests favorable to his claim, that he is the father of Amanda Stahr, the youngest of three children born to April Stahr, the mother, during her marriage to Steven Stahr, the husband. The mother and husband were married and opposed Appellant’s claim. The Superior Court found that the facts surrounding the situation barred Appellant from asserting the claim. Decision of Court: Affirmed. The Court found that the presumption of paternity applied, but was not rebuttable. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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Gardner v. Erie Ins. Co. 722 A.2d 1041 (Pa. 1999) Issue: The issue is whether an employee’s receipt of workers’ compensation benefits relating to injuries sustained while driving a co-employee’s automobile and arising out of wrongful third party conduct precluded him from recovering uninsured motorists benefits from co-employee’s insurance carrier. Decision of Court: The Court found that recovery was not precluded. It held than an employee, who was receiving workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving a co-employee’s vehicle and arising out of wrongful conduct, was not precluded by Section 205 of the MVFRL from recovery of uninsured motorist benefits from the co-employee’s insurance carrier. Affirmed. Position of Judge: Authored opinion.
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North Hills News Record v. Town of McCandless, 722 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1999) Issue: The question was whether an audio tape recording of a telephone call made to an emergency response center must be available to citizens asserting a right to disclose pursuant to the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act. Decision of Court: The Court held that the audio tape recordings of the telephone call to the emergency response center did not fix rights or duties nor were sufficiently associated with the form of agency determination to require their disclosure under the provisions of the Act. The Court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. Position of Judge: |